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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Is an employee suffering a physical or emotional injury
from the intentional tortious conduct of a fellow employee barred
from suing the employer by Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 of the Utah
Worker's Compensation Act?
REFERENCE TO REPORTS OF OPINIONS ISSUED BY
COURT OF APPEALS
The petition for a writ of certiorari is from a May 2,
1989, opinion issued by the Court of Appeals of the State of Utah
in Case No. 880189-CA, Percy Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
107 Utah Adv. Rpt. 71 (1989).
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS OF JURISDICTION
Utah Power & Light Company

("UP&L") believes that the

requirements of R. Utah S. Ct. 43 have

not been met and, there-

fore, this Court is without jurisdiction to review the Court of
Appeals decision.
In particular, UP&L believes that the provisions of R.
Utah S. Ct. 43(2) do not apply as the opinion of the Court of
Appeals is entirely consistent with and based upon the decisions
of this Court.
The proceedings before the Third District Court and the
Court of Appeals were

squarely

course of judicial proceedings.
instances of departure

within

the accepted

and

usual

The Appellant has not cited any

from this usual course.

Therefore, R.

Utah S. Ct. 43(3) does not apply and the exercise of this Court's
power of supervision is not required.
Finally, UP&L believes that as the Court of Appeals
opinion is based upon well settled law established by this Court,
and R. Utah S. Ct. 43(4) does not provide jurisdiction.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
The provision of Utah law, as defined and interpreted
by this Court, which is controlling is U.C.A. § 35-1-60 (1988),
which states:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to
the provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death
or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against the
employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against
any officer, agent or employee of the employer and
the liabilities of the employer imposed by this
act shall be in place of any and air other civil
liability whatsoever, at common law . r otherwise,
to such employee or to his spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs,
personal representatives, guardian, or any other
person whomsoever, on account of any accident or
injury or death in any way contracted, sustained,
aggravated or incurred by such employee in the
course of or because of or arising out of his
employment, and no action at law may be maintained
against an employer or against any officer, agent
or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in
this section, however, shall prevent an employee
(or his dependents) from filing a claim with the
industrial commission of Utah for compensation in
those cases within the provisions of the Utah
Occupational Disease Diability Act, as amended.
[Emphasis added]
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Percy Mounteer

("Mounteer"), a UP&L employee, claimed

that due to the intentional tortious act of a fellow UP&L employee,

a

pre-existing

employment

injury

was

aggravated

and

further, he was emotionally injured which required hospitalization.
).

Complaint M

9, 10, 11, and 12,

Mounteer sustained the new injuries during the course of

his employment.

The origins of his pre-existing medical problems

are also found in his employment.
R. 3 and 4.
act

Record pp. 4 and 5 (R.

required

Complaint ff 4, 5, 6, and 7;

The injuries resulting from the intentional tortious
medical

treatment

and

disabled Mounteer from employment.

permanently

and

Complaint 5 18; R. 5.

Mounteer only claims that UP&L is vicariously
for his medical
damages.

expenses, lost and

Mounteer

does

not

totally

claim

future wages, and
that

UP&L

liable
general

consciously

or

deliberately intended injury to him or directed that any other
employee injure him.
Based upon Mounteer1s

allegations, the complaint was

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.

R. 107 and 125.
ARGUMENT
The opinion

of

the

Court

of Appeals, affirming

lower court's dismissal of the action, is supportable on two
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the

independent grounds, both of which have been articulated by the
Utah Supreme Court.
First, Mounteer failed to allege, and indeed could not
in good faith allege, that UP&L intended injury to Mounteer or
that UP&L directed another employee to intentionally injure him.
Either of these two set of facts is a condition precedent to any
claim by an employee against the employer for injuries suffered
while on the job from the intentional acts of a fellow employee.
Bryan v. Utah Intern!1., 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975).

Accord, Lantz

v. Nat'l. Semiconductor Corp., 109 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (Ct. of App.
1989) and cases cited therein.
The Court of Appeals noted that Mounteer failed to meet
this condition and therefore, as a matter of law UP&L is not
liable by operation of vicarious liability.
If Mounteer had alleged facts supporting an
inference that UP&L directed or intended Larsen's
injurious actions, he would have sufficiently
stated a claim against UP&L directly and the
statute would likewise afford UP&L no shield from
liability and damages. "A complaint, to survive a
motion to dismiss, must do more than merely allege
intentional injury as an exception to the general
exclusiveness rule; it must allege facts that add
up to a deliberate intent [by the employer] to
bring about injury.
2A A. Larson, Workmens
Compensation Law § 68:14 (1987)."
Mounteer v.
Utah Power, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. at 73.
As Mounteer did not allege those facts, his complaint
was fatally defective.

This defect alone is sufficient reason to

affirm the trial court's dismissal of the action based as it is
on long established and unquestioned Utah law.

-4-

The second prong to UP&L's defense was that Mounteer's
complaint sought compensation for injuries which Mounteer alleged
were contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred during the
course and scope of his employment with UP&L.

The Utah Worker's

Compensation Act, UP&L argued, is the exclusive remedy for the
medical expenses, wage loss and physical and mental impairment
which Mounteer suffered.
Mounteer relates his present permanent physical and emotional disabilities to his employment with UP&L, or its predecessor, commencing in December 1984.

Mounteer claims that he

carried those injuries with him throughout his employment when,
in October 1986, they came to the surface because of an on-thejob

incident

resulting

in

hospitalization

and

physical

and

emotional disability.

The injuries Mounteer claims all arose

from the performance

of his duties as a UP&L employee, the

ultimate consequence of which was to permanentaly and totally
preclude him from working for UP&L.

There are no injuries which

more clearly fall within the definition in U.C.A. § 35-1-60 of
those injuries for which worker's compensation is the exclusive
remedy.

Importantly, the allegations

and description

of the

injuries which mandate the application of the exclusivity statute
come verbatum from Mounteer's pleadings.
The numerous citations by the Court of Appeals to the
well established precedent of this Court is, UP&L believes,

-5-

sufficient response to Mounteerfs argument that the Utah Supreme
Court has

either

decided

cases

differently

than the Court

of

Appeals or has not addressed the issue.
CONCLUSION
The facts that form the foundation upon which the trial
court and the Court of Appeals based their decisions are facts
which Mounteer alleged in his complaint.

These facts lead to the

same conclusion; the complaint failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted for two independent legal reasons.
First, Mounteer has failed to plead and cannot in good
faith

plead

Second,

the

injuries

for

an
very

absolute
injuries

which

he

was

conditional

element

which Mounteer
provided

the

to

his

describes
benefit

of

claim.

are

those

worker's

compensation in exchange for which he is barred from suing the
employer.
Each of these grounds upon which the Court of Appeals
based its decision, independent of one another, are well founded
in this Court's opinions.

The petition for Writ of Certiorari

should be denied.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

Jjj

day of June 1989.

UTAHPOWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Paul H. Proctor, Attorney for
Utah Power & Light Company
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PROOF OF SERVICE
PAUL H. PROCTOR, attorney for Utah Power & Light Company,
certifies that on June

$J^
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